Richard Clarke 9/11 prepared testimony
Former counterterrorism adviser prepared remarks before the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
MSNBC, March 24, 2004

The following is the prepared testimony, on March 24, 2004, by former 
counterterrorism adviser Richard A. Clarke, to the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

I am appreciative of the opportunity the Commission is offering for me to 
provide my observations about what went wrong in the struggle against al 
Qida, both before and after 9-11. I want the families of the victims to know 
that we tried to stop those attacks, that some people tried very hard. I 
want them to know why we failed and what I think we need to do to insure 
that nothing like that ever happens again.

I have testified for twenty hours before the House-Senate Joint Inquiry 
committee and before this Commission in closed hearings. Therefore, I 
will limit my prepared testimony to a chronological review of key facts and 
then provide some conclusions and summary observations, which may 
form the basis for further questions. My observations and answers to any 
questions are limited by my memory, because I do not have access to 
government files or classified information for purposes of preparing for this 
hearing.

I was assigned to the National Security Council staff in 1992 and had 
terrorism as part of my portfolio until late 2001. Terrorism became the 
predominant part of my duties during the mid-1990s and I was appointed 
National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism in 1998.

1. Terrorism without US Retaliation in the 1980s: In the 1980s, Hizballah 
killed 278 United States Marines in Lebanon and twice destroyed the US 
embassy. They kidnapped and killed other Americans, including the CIA 
Station chief. There was no direct US military retaliation. In 1989, 259 
people were killed on Pan Am 103. There was no direct US military 
retaliation. The George H. W. Bush administration did not have a formal 
counter-terrorism policy articulated in an NSC Presidential decision 
document.

2. Terrorism Early in the Clinton Administration: Within the first few weeks 
of the Clinton administration, there was terrorism in the US: the attack on 
the CIA gatehouse and the attack on the World Trade Center. CIA and FBI 
concluded at the time that there was no organization behind those attacks. 
Similarly, they did not report at the time that al Qida was involved in the 
planned attack on Americans in Yemen in 1992 or the Somali attacks on 
US and other peacekeepers in 1993. Indeed, CIA and FBI did not report 
the existence of an organization named al Qida until the mid-1990s, seven 
years after it was apparently created. Nonetheless, the 1993 attacks and 
then the terrorism in the Tokyo subway and the Oklahoma City bombing 
caused the Clinton Administration to increase its focus on terrorism and to 
expand funding for counter-terrorism programs.

In August, al Qida attacked two US embassies in East Africa. Following 
the attacks, the United States responded militarily with cruise missile 
attacks on al Qida facilities. President Clinton was widely criticized for 
doing so. A US Marine deployment, combined with CIA activity, disrupted 
a third attack planned in Tirana, Albania.

President Clinton requested the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to develop 
follow-on military strike plans, including the use of US Special Forces. The 
Chairman recommended against using US forces on the ground in 
Afghanistan, but placed submarines with cruise missiles offshore awaiting 
timely intelligence of the location of Usama bin Ladin.

The President also requested CIA to develop follow-on covert action 
plans. He authorized lethal activity in a series of directives which 
progressively expanded the authority of CIA to act against al Qida in 
Afghanistan.

Diplomatic activity also increased, including UN sanctions against the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and pressure on Pakistan to cooperate 
further in attempts to end the Taliban support for al Qida.

6. National Coordinator: In 1998,1 was appointed by the President to a 
newly created position of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 
Protection and Counter-terrorism. Although the Coordinator was appointed 
to the Cabinet level NSC Principals Committee, the position was limited at 
the request of the departments and agencies. The Coordinator had no 
budget, only a dozen staff, and no ability to direct actions by the 
departments or agencies. The President authorized ten security and 
counter-terrorism programs and assigned leadership on each program 
(e.g. Transportation Security) to an agency lead.

7. 1999: The Clinton Administration continued to pursue intelligence, 
including covert action, military, law enforcement, and diplomatic activity to 
disrupt al Qida.

CIA was unable to develop timely intelligence to support the planned 
follow-on military strikes. On three occasions, CIA reported it knew where 
Usama bin Ladin was, but all three times the Director of Central 
Intelligence recommended against military action because of the poor 
quality of the intelligence. Eventually, the US submarines on station for the 
military operation returned to normal duties. CLA's assets in Afghanistan 
were unable to utilize the lethal covert action authorities and CIA 
recommended against placing its own personnel in Afghanistan to carry 
out the operations. Captures of al Qida personnel outside of Afghanistan 
continued.

In December, 1999 intelligence and law enforcement information indicated 
that al Qida was planning attacks against the US. The President ordered 
the Principals Committee to meet regularly to prevent the attacks. That 
Cabinet level committee met throughout December, 1999 to review 
intelligence and develop counter-measures. The planned al Qida attacks 
were averted.

10. 2001: On January 24, 2001 I requested in writing an urgent meeting 
of the NSC Principals committee to address the al Qida threat. That 
meeting took place on September 4, 2001. It was preceded by a number 
of Deputies Committee meetings, beginning in April. Those meetings 
considered proposals to step up activity against al Qida, including military 
assistance to anti-Taliban Afghan factions.

In June and July, intelligence indicated an increased likelihood of a major 
al Qida attack against US targets, probably in Saudi Arabia or Israel. In 
response, the interagency Counter-terrorism Security Group agreed upon 
a series of steps including a series of warning notices that an attack could 
take place in the US. Notices were sent to federal agencies (Immigration, 
Customs, Coast Guard, FAA, FBI, DOD, and State), state and local police, 
airlines, and airports.

In retrospect, we know that there was information available to some in the 
FBI and CIA that al Qida operatives had entered the United States. That 
information was not shared with the senior FBI counter-terrorism official 
(Dale Watson) or with me, despite the heightened state of concern in the 
Counter-terrorism Security Group.

Observations and Conclusions
Although there were people in the FBI, CIA, Defense Department, State 
Department, and White House who worked very hard to destroy al Qida 
before it did catastrophic damage to the US, there were many others who 
found the prospect of significant al Qida attacks remote. In both CIA and 
the military there was reluctance at senior career levels to fully utilize all of 
the capabilities available. There was risk aversion. FBI was, throughout 
much of this period, organized, staffed, and equipped in such a way that it 
was ineffective in dealing with the domestic terrorist threat from al Qida.
At the senior policy levels in the Clinton Administration, there was an 
acute understanding of the terrorist threat, particularly al Qida. That 
understanding resulted in a vigorous program to counter al Qida including 
lethal covert action, but it did not include a willingness to resume bombing 
of Afghanistan. Events in the Balkans, Iraq, the Peace Process, and 
domestic politics occurring at the same time as the anti-terrorism effort 
played a role.

The Bush Administration saw terrorism policy as important but not urgent, 
prior to 9-11. The difficulty in obtaining the first Cabinet level (Principals) 
policy meeting on terrorism and the limited Principals' involvement sent 
unfortunate signals to the bureaucracy about the Administration's attitude 
toward the al Qida threat.

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