1945 US President Roosevelt makes oil-for-security deal with Saudi King Ibn Saud

1971 British give up military domination of Persian Gulf, US expands military in Gulf.

1980 US President Carter Doctrine: US will fight any power than restricts access to Persian Gulf oil.

1980s US supports Saddam Hussein regime in war against Iran, gives economic aid, military intelligence, access to weapons technology, etc.

1990 - 2002 US aircraft bomb Iraq, embargo many basic imports, including medicine

1995 US declares it will defend Gulf interest unilaterally, if necessary (Assist. Sec. of Defense Joseph Nye)

Sources: M. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, New York, 2001; D. Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, New York, 1992; news reports.

North America	63.9	6%	Kuwait	96.5	9%
South&Cent.America	96	9%	Saudi Arabia	261.8	25%
Europe	18.7	2%	United Arab Emirates	97.8	9%
Former Soviet Union	65.4	6%	Total Middle East	685.6	65%
Iran	89.7	9%	Africa	76.7	7%
Iraq	112.5	11%	Asia Pacific	43.8	4%
Source: BP reports			TOTAL WORLD	1050	100%

Where Imported	Imports	Imports as % of	Consumption	M. E. Imports as
		M. E. Exports		% of Consumption
USA	2775	14.5%	19633	14.1%
Canada	145	0.8%	1929	7.5%
South & Cent. America	260	1.4%	4693	5.5%
Europe	3548	18.6%	16093	22.0%
Africa	831	4.4%	2490	33.4%
China	689	3.6%	5041	13.7%
Japan	4211	22.0%	5427	77.6%
Other Asian Pacific	6588	34.5%	10448	63.1%
Total, Excl Former USSR	19098	100.0%	71884	26.6%
Source: BP reports

1	ExxonMobil	213.5
2	ChevronTexaco	106.2
3	Conoco	39.5
4	Marathon	33.0
5	Phillips	26.9
6	Occidental	14.1
7	Amerada Hess	13.6
8	Anadarko	8.4
9	Unocal	6.8
10	Murphy	4.5
	TOTAL	466.5

The French company TotalFinaElf and Russian companies have huge contracts for Iraqi oil. US is now considering whether to make deals about Iraqi oil with Russia and France for their support in attacking Iraq. The bonanza of Iraqi oil is a major attraction for "supermajor" oil companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron Texaco.

1. This view says that oil is necessary for the wasteful life style of U. S. consumers who drive SUVs. Since conservation, higher gas prices, or alternative power sources might eliminate need for Middle East oil, which is less than 15% of US consumption, it suggests that the US consumer is to responsible for the policy of U.S. military domination of the Persian Gulf. These ideas undoubtedly do have some influence on public opinion, but do not explain how and why the U. S. gov't acts.

2. This view says that it is the interests of U.S. multinational ("supermajor") oil companies that drive U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. These companies have access (and sweetheart deals) in the Gulf, which is maintained by a U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia, and other reactionary Gulf states. The companies use their enormous influence over the U.S. government to defend this. The majority of their oil is not sold to the U.S. consumer. (65% of ExxonMobil petroleum product sales are outside the U. S.) U. S. consumers, however, have to pay in blood and taxes to preserve these companies’ huge profits.

1. "The Persian Gulf is one of the few regions whose importance to the United States is obvious. The flow of Gulf oil will continue to be crucial to the economic well-being of the industrialized world for the foreseeable future; developments in the Gulf will have a critical impact on issues ranging from Arab-Israeli relations and religious extremism to terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation.Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring Persian Gulf security and stability is a vital U. S. interest."

-- Zbigniew Brzezinski (National Security Advisor to President Carter), Brent Scowcroft (National Security Advisor to George Bush, Sr.) and Richard Murphy (Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow), "Differentiated Containment," Foreign Affairs, May/June, 1997, pp. 20, emphasis added.

2. Frontline: "And it's so essential to us geographically to have them [U. S. troops] there [in the Persian Gulf]?"

Richard Armitage: "I'd say geo-politically. It's very essential that we protect the survival of those states, that we protect our access to the oil which flows out of the Persian Gulf, and it's been seen by successive administrations and successive Congresses as being in our interest to have troops stationed there."

-- PBS Frontline interview with Richard Armitage, September, 2001. Armitage is U.S. Deputy Secretary of State. He was also Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan and George Bush administrations. Emphasis added.

3. "U.S. DEFENSE OBJECTIVES: The United States seeks a Middle East and South Asia at peace, where access to strategic natural resources at stable prices is unhindered, where no hostile power is able to exercise de facto hegemony, and where free markets are expanding. The region cannot be stable until there is a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Arabs and Israelis and a peaceful resolution to Indian-Pakistani disputes. Stability also cannot be achieved until Iraq, Iran, and Libya abide by international norms and no longer threaten regional security….

U.S. REGIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE AND ACTIVITIES: The United States military presence in the Middle East includes a limited long-term presence and a larger number of rotational and temporarily deployed forces. An average of approximately 20,000 U.S. military personnel, as well as prepositioned critical materiel, are in the region to deter aggression and promote stability. These forces enforce United Nations resolutions, deter aggression by hostile states, ensure the free flow of commerce, and work with regional partners to improve interoperability and regional nations’ individual and collective self-defense capabilities…. The United States’ vital interests in the security and stability of the Middle East and its unique military and political position give the United States an indispensable role in promoting regional stability and advancing the cause of peace."

-- William Cohen, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Chapter 1, U.S. Defense Strategy, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 2000, pp. 15, 16, emphasis added.